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ARE SMITH AND HIALEAH
RECONCILABLE?
Larry Alexander*
I

In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
of Oregon v. Smith, the Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause does not mandate religious exemptions from "generally applicable law."1 In Smith, the law of general applicability
was one banning the use of various drugs, including peyote. The
religious exemption in question was one for the Native American
Church, which uses peyote in its rituals. So long as the law of
general applicability has a legitimate secular purpose, i.e., as long
as it is not so arbitrary as to be a denial of due process, its burdening of religious practices does not violate the Free Exercise
Clause. Put differently, the state's denial of a religious exemption need not serve more than a legitimate secular interest, contrary to what the law prior to Smith had been, at least as stated.
Prior to Smith, the black letter law required that denial of a religious exemption be supported by a compelling governmental interest. Not so after Smith.
If we can schematize the free exercise doctrine after Smith, it
would look like this: For any secular value V, the state may rank
V above any religious value R (so long as R is manifest in conduct and not merely belief or expression). Or, V > R is constitutionally permissible.
II

The citizens of Hialeah, Florida apparently find the ritual
sacrifice of chickens by the Santerian religious sect a disgusting
and perhaps immoral practice. In 1987, Hialeah passed an ordinance banning the slaughter of animals but making so many exceptions that, for practical purposes, only the Santerians and
perhaps wanton animal killers came within the ordinance. The
*
1.

Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego.
494 u.s. 872, 878 (1990).
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Supreme Court found the ordinance to be violative of the Free
Exercise Clause.z Unlike the law of general applicability in
Smith, this law discriminated against a religious practice.

III
According to Smith, so long as Hialeah wants to protect the
lives of chickens or other animals for secular reasons, e.g., Hialeah values the lives of animals, it may pass a law banning the
slaughter of animals and need not exempt the Santerians. The
value of animal life (VA) may trump the Santerians' religious
value R without violating the Free Exercise Clause.
IV
Any other (secular) V can trump R as well. (This follows
from 1.) For example, suppose there were a religious sect whose
practices required that wild animals be left undisturbed by
humans. A law allowing the hunting of wild animals, perhaps for
sport, perhaps for food, would be constitutionally permissible
under Smith. For the secular value of hunting (VH) can permissibly trump the religious value R.

v
Now suppose Hialeah bans all killing of animals but makes
exceptions for sport hunting and for slaughtering animals for
food but not for religious rituals. Hialeah has now ranked the
value of animal life (VA) above the Santerians' religious value
(R), and has ranked the values of hunting (VH) and meat-as-food
(VM) above the value of animal life (VA)· Schematically, theresult is (V H & V M) > VA > R. Since the Free Exercise Clause
permits VA > R, V H > R, and V M> R, logically it should permit
Hialeah's statute.
VI
But now it is hard to see exactly what the constitutional
wrong is in Hialeah. The Court treats Hialeah as "hostile" to the
Santerians. Perhaps the Court is relying on Hialeah's affirmative
ill will toward Santerians rather than Hialeah's mere ranking of
their religious practices as of lower value than any secular value.
This is a fine line to draw. It would seem to require hostility
toward beliefs and not just hostility toward conduct, so that not
2.

Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
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making a religious exception to laws against homicide for sacrifices of vestal virgins is constitutionally permissible so long as the
state is antagonistic only to the homicidal conduct and not to the
beliefs that motivate it. Of course, if the state were motivated by
hostility to the beliefs, it would arguably be violating the speech
clause of the First Amendment, and the Free Exercise Clause
would be doing no work.
VII
But if having too many exceptions by itself takes a law out
from under Smith and places it under Hialeah, then Smith must
not be read to deny that religion carries some affirmative weight
on the scales, even against a law of general applicability.
This point can be made from two different angles. If exceptions for values like hunting or food but not for religion require a
compelling government interest, then it must not be true that
those values can always trump the religious value. Rather, they
can do so only if they are much more valuable than the religious
value. This means religious values have an affirmative (and compelling) weight, contrary to the implication of Smith that religious values can be subordinated to any legitimate secular value.
The other way to get to the same conclusion is to note that
the law in Smith, the paradigm case of a law of general applicability, can be looked at as making an exception for one secular
value but not for a religious value. For example, why was peyote
banned but not alcohol (which is, of course, used as a sacrament
in some religions)? And why were drugs banned but not other
activities that could be harmful? If the state had to show a compelling interest, and not merely some legitimate secular interest
to justify these distinctions, Smith would be directly contradicted.
All laws of general applicability can be looked at as exceptions
within a more general class of activities. The drug laws in Smith
surely are, as the question about the alcohol exception indicates.
If Smith means that Oregon does not have to justify the "peyote
but not alcohol" distinction by showing more than a mere legitimate interest, and that has to be what Smith means, then Hialeah's analysis turns murky.
VIII
The preceding arguments also refute the account of the Free
Exercise Clause recently put forward by Professors Eisgruber
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and Sager.3 They defend Smith with an excellent case against the
special privileging of religiously-based conduct. If there is some
secular value, V" that is impaired by a law advancing another
secular value, V 2, and the state grants no exemption from the law
where V1 is impaired, the state need not grant an exemption for a
religious value, VR, that is also impaired. For any V 2 that the
state ranks above V], the state may also conclude V 2 > V R·4
On the other hand, Eisgruber and Sager also argue that once
the state grants exemptions for some, it must not "discriminate"
against religious claimants but must treat them with equal regard.
But an equality theory needs a metric, a currency, by which different claimants can be compared. If the legislature criminalizes
alcohol but not peyote, or exempts golf courses but not churches
from zoning laws, how is the equality claim to be assessed? One
way would be by comparing intensity of preferences-do golfers
desire their exemption more intensely than churchgoers? Eisgruber and Sager come close to endorsing this view when they
argue that the state must adopt the religious believer's perspective in order to appreciate the gravity of his interest in an exemption.s But this looks like the intensity of preference test that
they reject in their argument against privileging religious
exemptions.6
More importantly, the distinction they draw between forbidding inequalities among possible claimants for exemptions and
3. Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1245
(1994). See also Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, Unthinking Religious
Freedom, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 577 (1996).
4. Eisgruber and Sager illustrate this point by comparing the case of an Army officer refused permission to wear a yarmulke, as his religion requires, because of the
Army's interest in uniform appearance with the case of another Army officer refused
permission to go tie1ess, as a skin disorder requires, because of the same interest in uniform appearance. They argue that the Free Exercise Clause should not be read to privilege the former's claim (by requiring an exemption) over the latter's. Eisgruber and
Sager, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1264-65 (cited in note 3).
At the core of Eisgruber and Sager's case for Smith is their argument that religious
claims for exemptions can only be assigned a value by the legislature in two ways. The
first is to assign a value based on the intensity of the desires with which they are held_
This allows the religious claims to be weighed against competing secular claims based on
secular values, which can also be reduced to that currency. Eisgruber and Sager reject the
idea that the Free Exercise Clause is nothing but a signpost pointing toward preferenceutilitarianism as a constitutional mandate. In any event, legislatures are surely preferable
to courts in terms of assessing the intensity of the electorate's desires.
The alternative way that religious claims can be assigned a value is from a sectarian
standpoint. But that standpoint is, according to Eisgruber and Sager, one that the Establishment Clause rules out of bounds.
5. !d. at 1285-86.
6. See supra note 4.
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not demanding privileging does not withstand analysis. In every
case of a religion's seeking an exemption, it is demanding that its
religious value V R not be subordinated to the secular value V 5 •
The state has ranked V s > V R· The religion wants "equality." If
the Free Exercise Clause does not forbid the ranking V 5 > VR in
the Smith context, it cannot forbid the exact same ranking in the
context of granting exemptions for Vs but not for VR. Only if all
values are reduced to a common currency, such as intensity of
desire, and only if the Constitution requires the legislature to
deal exclusively in that currency, can we have a principled comparison of V s and V R· But that comparison can be made in both
the Smith and the Hialeah contexts.
IX
Leaving aside cases where the government is motivated by
hostility to a religion's beliefs, arguably a free speech issue, Hialeah cannot be good law if Smith is and vice versa. Smith and
Hialeah raised the identical issue: Do religious values have to be
given any positive weight when put in the balance against secular
values? Smith says "no." Hialeah says ''yes.'' They cannot both
be correct.

